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The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) expends considerable efforts in regulating medications
approved for use.  Yet the impact of medication labeling changes on brand pharmaceutical products,
and whether and what firms do to respond to increased information regarding the safety and efficacy
of a drug, have not be characterized. We propose a behavioral framework for examining the effects
of FDA advisories on branded pharmaceutical firms and their products.  We empirically assess the
impact of recent FDA advisories on the stock market valuations of a sample of branded pharmaceutical
manufacturing firms using event study methods.  We examine whether and how branded pharmaceutical
manufacturers respond to an advisory by assessing changes in promotion compared to non-affected
firms.  We find firms targeted by an advisory have average stock price declines of 3% in three days
and 11% in five days following the advisory release, and in turn appear to decrease total physician-directed
promotion spending, journals ads and detailing visits significantly six months following the advisory
release; the provision of free samples is unaffected.  We find no changes among therapeutic substitutes
unaffected by the advisory. Results of sensitivity analyses suggest firms with market dominant positions
experience similar decreases in stock market valuations and physician-directed promotion compared
to pooled results.  The results are also robust to alternative definitions of the timing of advisory release
dates and the severity of advisories’ wording.  Theory and empirical results suggest the public release
of FDA advisories negatively impacts firm’s short-term market valuations. The results suggest an
additional rationale for previously documented declines in prescribing after FDA advisory releases
– significant declines in physician-directed promotion following FDA advisory releases; the combined
(and likely correlated) effects of the release of the advisory and declines in physician-directed promotion
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The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requests labeling changes and 
issues advisories to communicate important new prescription drug safety and efficacy 
information through its Medwatch system to American health care providers and the 
public.1,2  The Sentinel Initiative, a drug safety monitoring system enacted as part of the 
2007 FDA Amendments Act, increases the role of the FDA’s Office of Surveillance and 
Epidemiology (OSE) in evaluating new safety information available after the market launch 
of a prescription drug in the United States (US).  Several analyses have estimated the 
magnitude and timing of changes in physician prescribing of drugs following FDA-requested 
labeling changes and public health advisories (PHAs) including but not limited to black box 
warnings,3 while others have examined how PHAs impact the frequency of clinical 
monitoring or patient morbidity and mortality.4  
 
Although these studies offer important insights, they neglect analyses of the impacts of 
PHAs on pharmaceutical firms.  The lay press5 and economic theory6 suggest firm market 
                                                 
1 See US Food and Drug Administration, 2007.  Guidance drug safety information – FDA’s 
communication to the public. January 2007. Available at: 
http://www.FDA.gov/cder/guidance/7477fnl.htm#_Toc159824037. (Accessed May 27, 
2009).  
2 See Hamburg MA, Sharfstein JM.  The FDA as a public health agency. New England Journal 
of Medicine. 2009;360:2493-2495 and Law Strengthens FDA. Available at: 
http://www.FDA.gov/oc/initiatives/advance/FDAaa.html (Accessed January 21, 2009). 
3 See Jacoby JL, Fulton J, Cesta M, Heller M.  After the black box warning: dramatic changes in 
ED use of droperidol.  American Journal of Emergency Medicine.  2005;23:196; Morgan OW, 
Griffiths C, Majeed A. Interrupted time-series analysis of regulations to reduce paracetamol 
(acetaminophen) poisoning. PLoS Med. 2007;4:e105; Smalley W, Shatlin D, Wysowski DK, et 
al.  Contraindicated use of Cisapride: impact of Food and Drug Administration Regulatory 
Action. Journal of the American Medicine Association. 2000;284:3036-3039. 
4 See Gibbons RD, Brown H, Hur K, et al. Early evidence on the effects of regulators’ 
suicidality warnings on SSRI prescriptions and suicide in children and adolescents. 
American Journal of Psychiatry. 2007;164:1356-1363; Nemeroff CB, Kalali A, Keller MB, 
Charney DS, Lenderts SE, Cascade EF, Stephenson H, Schatzberg AF.  Impact of publicity 
concerning pediatric suicidality data on physician practice patterns in the US. Archives of 
General Psychiatry. 2007;64:466-472; Katz LY, Kozyrskyj AL, Prior HJ, et al. Effect of 
regulatory warnings on antidepressant prescription rates, use of health services and 
outcomes among children, adolescents and young adults. CMAJ.  2008;178:1005-1011. 
5 See Gardner J. When a Patent-protected drug gets hit by bad news. US News World Rep. 
November 1992;8:71; Damage control. AdWeek [Western ed]. November 25, 1996;46:3;  
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valuations may be affected by the public release of information altering the perceived 
quality of a prescription drug.6  Firms marketing patent-protected prescription drugs may 
respond strategically to such developments via price-setting and/or promotion strategies. 
Quantifying the direction, magnitude and correlation between market valuation changes 
and changes in prescription drug price-setting and promotion after the release of a PHA are 
important for the FDA’s ability to interpret patient and provider responses to previously 
released PHAs, and in anticipating reactions to future PHAs. 
  
In this paper we propose a behavioral framework and derive specific hypotheses for 
examining the effects of PHAs on the stock market valuations of pharmaceutical firms and 
whether and how firms may respond to PHAs.  We then investigate these hypotheses using 
empirical data.  This is the first paper we have identified in the literature that theoretically 
and empirically investigates the impact of PHAs on firms’ market valuations and strategic 
decision-making. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES  
 
A review of previous theoretical and empirical work establishes a behavioral framework for 
the empirical analyses (Chart).  Following Scherer (1993), we assume manufacturers of 
pharmaceutical drugs may possess market power enabling them to set prices exceeding 
marginal costs.7 Market power is primarily conferred by patent protection, which prohibits 
another firm from selling the same drug between the FDA’s approval of the drug for 
marketing in the US and its expiration.  Previous research suggests marketing efforts are a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Zate M. Two words you won’t see: apologize, regret. Ventura County Star. August 26, 
2000:D01. 
6 See Berndt, ER, Kyle MK, Ling DC. The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration: Generic Entry 
and Rx-to-OTC Switches, Scanner Data and Price Indexes. (Robert C. Feenstra and Matthew 
D. Shapiro, eds, 2003); Huskamp HG, Donohue JM, Koss C, Berndt ER, Frank RG.  Generic 
Entry, Reformulations and Promotion of SSRIs in the U.S. Pharmacoeconomics. 
2008;26:603-616;  
Suh DC, Manning WG, Schondelmeyer S, Hadsall RS.  Effect of Multiple-Source Entry on Price 
Competition After Patent Expiration in the Pharmaceutical Industry.  Health Services 
Research. 2000;35:529-547. 
7 See Scherer F.M. Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 97-115.  
The marginal production costs for small drug medications are typically assumed to be low.      
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key determinant of demand for prescription drugs.8 Close to $30 billion was devoted to 
prescription drug promotion in 2008, suggesting the importance of this spending among 
firms to build and maintain market share.9,10  
 
The efficient markets tradition in financial economics suggests capital markets 
instantaneously incorporate all relevant information into the stock price of a publicly 
traded firm.11 This implies share prices should change quickly when the market receives 
value relevant information.  Panattoni (2011) uses this framework to investigate the impact 
of Paragraph IV patent infringement decisions on a representative sample of 
pharmaceutical firms.  Such decisions determine whether another firm can enter its non-
branded product into the market before patent expiration.12  Findings suggest Paragraph IV 
decisions have considerable consequences for firms: two-day stock price valuations for 
firms marketing the patent-protected drug decrease 5.2 percent and trading volumes 
increase when courts awarded permission to enter the market to generic manufacturing 
firms. Consequently, we hypothesize:  
(H1) Firms whose drugs are targeted by a PHA will experience short-term decreases in 
stock valuation and increases in trading volume (Chart). 
 
The derived demand for medical care tradition in health economics suggests physicians (as 
agents for their patients) choose treatments based on their perceived marginal benefits over 
                                                 
8 Avorn J, Chen M, Hartley R. Scientific versus commercial sources of influence on the 
prescribing behavior of physicians. American Journal of Medicine. 1982;73:4-8; Donohue 
JM, Cevasco M, Rosenthal MB.  A decade of direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription 
drugs. New England Journal of Medicine. 2007;357:673-681.  
9 IMS Health. Top-line industry data: total US promotion spend by type. 2008 [online]. 
Available from: 
http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/Top_Line_
Data/U.S._Promo_Spend_Data_2008.pdf  (Accessed 11.8.2009).   
10 A firm maximizing its profits will promote up to the point where the incremental 
revenues just equal the sum of the incremental marketing and production costs. 
11 See Brown S, Warner J. Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies.  Journal of 
Financial Economics 1985;14:3-31; Campbell J, A Lo, AC MacKinlay.  The Econometrics of 
Financial Markets.  Princeton University Press, 1997. 
12 See Panattoni LE, The effect of Paragraph IV decisions and generic entry before patent 
expiration on brand pharmaceutical firms, Journal of Health Economics. 2011;30(1):126-
145.  
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“costs”.13 Consequently, a physician’s treatment decision-making should be influenced by a 
firm’s choice of prices and promotion of medical treatments, such as patent protected 
drugs.14    
 
The conjectural variations literature provides a model for a biopharmaceutical firm’s choice 
of prices and promotion for a patent-protected drug. A profit-maximizing oligopolistic firm 
facing a downward sloping linear demand curve should set its optimal price-cost margin ([p 
– MC]/p, where p is price and MC is marginal production cost) equal to the inverse of the 
absolute value of the demand elasticity with respect to price.  Its optimal promotional 
intensity (promotion expenditures/sales ratio, A/R) will be set equal to the product of the 
price-cost margin times the sum of the elasticity of demand with respect to its own 
promotion, ,    , plus the elasticity of its rival’s advertising in response to the firm’s own 
promotion,         times the elasticity of the firm’s own demand with respect to the its rival 
firm’s promotion,     –    (1).15   
(1) 
 
   
    
                        . 
Since the product of the positive term        (the rival firm’s promotion response to own 
firm’s promotion change) and the negative term       (the effect of the rival’s increased firm 
promotion on own firm demand) is negative, own firm’s optimal choice of the A/R ratio is 
potentially negatively offset by the rival firm’s promotion and price setting.  The model 
implies the marginal profitability from promotion increases as the price elasticity of 
demand for the good decreases in absolute value, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, firms should 
alter the pricing and/or promotion intensity of a drug based on anticipated changes in its 
own price elasticity of demand.  PHAs will likely result in an increase in the absolute value 
of demand elasticity for the drug with respect to price, and consequently a reduction in the 
firm’s gross margin on that product, ceteris paribus. 
 
Based on this model, we hypothesize (Chart): 
                                                 
13 See Grossman M. Chapter 7: The human capital model.  In Culyer AJ and Newhouse JP 
(editors) Handbook of Health Economics, first edition.  North Holland: Elsevier, 2000.  The 
costs include impacts resulting from side effect profiles.  They may also include the marginal 
price of the product for a course of therapy. 
14 See Dorfman R, Steiner PO. Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality. The American 
Economic Review. 1954; 44(5):826-836. 
15 See Schmalansee R. The economics of advertising. Amsterdam, North Holland Inc, 1972.  
5 
(H2) Following the release of a PHA targeting their patent-protected drug, 
biopharmaceutical firms will anticipate changes in revenue and consequently alter 
promotion intensities.   
(H3) Based on Palda (1969, 1973) and Huskamp et al. (2008), firm changes in promotion 
expenditure intensity will extend to setting optimal intensities among different promotion 
channels, where under an assumption of constant unit promotion costs the optimal ratio of 
spending for any two promotion channels equals the ratio of their promotion elasticities.16  
(H4) Firms will also alter pricing intensities after the release of a targeted PHA.   
Changes in strategy will likely occur weeks to months after the PHA’s release since they 
involve communications with the FDA, within firm decision-making and between firm 
contracting (Chart).  
 
The effects of PHAs may act differentially based on the market power commanded by the 
targeted drug.  The Dorfman-Steiner model suggests market power is conferred through the 
term relating the revenue generation of one product to the firm’s total revenue.  Previous 
empirical work suggests the order of a drug’s entry into a therapeutic class and subsequent 
market share in terms of class utilization are additional indicators of market power (and 
strongly correlated with pricing and promotion).17,18 Consequently, we hypothesize, 
(H5) Following a PHA, changes in a firm’s market valuation, drug pricing and/or promotion 
may be correlated with its preceding market power (Chart *).19  
                                                 
16 See Huskamp HG et al 2008; Palda KS. Does Advertising Influence Votes? An Analysis of 
the 1966 and 1970 Quebec Elections. 1973; Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue 
canadienne de science politique 6(4):638-655 ; Palda KS. Economic analysis for marketing 
decisions.  Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1969;  Jean-Jacques Lambin. Optimal 
Allocation of Competitive Marketing Efforts: An Empirical Study. The Journal of Business. 
1970;43(4):468-484. Narayanan S, Desiraju R, Chintagunta PK.  Return on Investment 
Implications for Pharmaceutical Promotional Expenditures: The Role of Marketing-Mix 
Interactions. The Journal of Marketing. 2004;68(4):90-105. 
17 See Rosenthal MB, Berndt ER, Donohue JM, Epstein AM, Frank RG 2003; Urban GL, Carter 
T, Gaskin S, Mucha Z.  Market Share Rewards to Pioneering Brands: An Empirical Analysis 
and Strategic Implications. Management Science. 1996;32(6), June, 645-659; Scott Morton F.  
Entry Decisions in the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Entry Decisions in the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Industry. The RAND Journal of Economics. 1999;30(3):421-440.  
18 This is also consistent with FDA practice: the OSE considers the number and benefit/risk 
tradeoff of potential therapeutic substitutes when assessing the evidence in support of 
issuing a Medwatch safety advisory for a specific drug and its content.  See Hamburg MA, 
Sharfstein JM 2009.   
19 In practice, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act requires drug labels and 
promotional materials contain all risk information in “brief summary” relating to side  
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We refine these hypotheses for empirical consideration based on economic theory and 
practical constraints.  First, economists have debated whether pharmaceutical marketing 
serves a largely informational or persuasive role.20  If promotion is strictly informational, it 
acts to increase patient and physician awareness of treatment options.21  If promotion is 
strictly persuasive, it acts to create “artificial” perceptions of benefit/costs among potential 
therapeutic substitutes and may cause physicians to prescribe a particular drug based on 
habit.22,23 The evidence in support of pharmaceutical promotion being informational or 
persuasive is mixed, suggesting both functions are operative.  Generally, studies support the 
hypothesis that the informational role dominates in the beginning of a drug’s life-cycle with 
the persuasive role taking over as uncertainty regarding quality is resolved.24   
Consequently, we refine H2’ (and by extension H3’) to suggest: 
                                                                                                                                                 
effects, contraindications and effectiveness.  Promotional materials cannot be false or 
misleading or omit material facts and must present a “fair balance” between effectiveness 
and risk information. The FDA’s Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and 
Communications (DDMAC) is responsible for the practical enforcement of these 
responsibilities. In the case of revisions to the known benefit/risk ratio of a patent-
protected drug, the Act requires firms to initiate revisions to the product label and related 
promotional materials. DDMAC prioritizes its review of promotion materials, including 
revisions of brief summaries for marketed drugs, using a risk-based approach. The review 
process has variable timing and may include direct interactions between pharmaceutical 
firm representatives and DDMAC staff, largely unobservable by the public.  Consequently, 
the release of a PHA will likely change the content of promotion efforts due to branded 
firms’ compliance with FDA regulatory enforcement.  These changes could be made without 
altering the overall level of promotion spending on a drug. However, changes in the content 
of drug promotion is beyond the scope of this analysis and consequently left for future 
work. 
20 See Leffler KB. Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription Drug 
Advertising. Journal of Law and Economics. 1981;24(1): 45-74; Hurwitz MA, Caves RE. 
Persuasion or Information? Promotion and the Shares of Patent-protectedPatent-protected 
and Generic Pharmaceuticals. Journal of Law and Economics. 1988;(31)2: 299-320; 
Lakdawalla D, Philipson T, Wang YR. Intellectual Property and Marketing. NBER Working 
Paper No. 12577 2006;  Berndt ER. To inform or persuade? Direct-to-consumer advertising 
of prescription drugs. New Engl Jnl Medicine 352:4:325-8, January 27, 2005.  
21 Consistent with the literature, such promotion does not affect the shape of a drug’s 
demand elasticity with respect to price but may shift its intercept, ceteris paribus. 
22 See Lakdawalla D, Philipson T, Wang YR 2006. 
23 Consistent with the literature, persuasive promotion reduces a drug’s demand elasticity 
with respect to price, ceteris paribus. 
24 See Hurwitz MA and Caves RE 1988;  Leffler KB 1981; Gonul F, Carter F, Petrova E, 
Srinivasan K. Promotion of Prescription Drugs and Its Impact on Physicians’ Choice 
Behavior. J. Marketing. 2001; 65(3):79-90; Rizzo JA. Advertising and Competition in the 
Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs. Journal of Economics  
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(H2’/H3’) If branded promotion is generally informational in nature, the PHA should result 
in either (1) no change in promotion expenditure and promotion channel intensity; or (2) 
an increase in promotion intensity to inform existing consumers of the drug’s updated 
benefit/cost tradeoff.   If patent-protected promotion is generally persuasive, then the PHA 
should result in a decrease in promotion intensity since this information would make 
promotion less effective in softening the drug’s demand response to price, ceteris paribus.  
Testing H4 in empirical data requires researchers to observe pricing changes in the market.  
While empirical evidence suggests pharmaceutical pricing may change due to developments 
in market competition25, the external validity of this evidence is limited since these studies 
rely on observed changes in list prices.  List prices for patent-protected therapies likely mis-
measure transaction prices with unknown bias due to the presence and proprietary nature 
of discounts, rebates and charge-backs.26  The direction and magnitude of the relative 




Sample Selection Methods and Data 
We empirically evaluate H1, H2’ and H3’ in a panel of patent-protected prescription drugs 
for which the FDA’s OSE released a PHA requiring labeling changes between 2004 and 
2009, and compare impacts on them to similar medications untargeted by a simultaneous 
PHA. Data were obtained on the number and nature of all PHAs released between January 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Law 1999;42: 89-116; Narayanan S, Manchanda P, Chintagunta P. Temporal Differences 
in the Role of Marketing Communication in New Product Categories. Journal of Marketing 
Research. 2005;42:278-90; Rosenthal MB, Berndt ER, Donohue JM, Epstein AM,Frank RG. 
Demand Effects of Recent Changes in Prescription Drug Promotion. Frontiers in Health 
Policy Res. 2003; 1-26; Azoulay P. Do Pharmaceutical Sales Respond to Scientific Evidence? 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 2002;11(4): 551-594; Berndt ER, Bui L, 
Reiley DR, Urban GL. Information, marketing, and pricing in the U.S. antiulcer drug market. 
American Economic Review. 1995;85(2):100-5.  
25 See Huskamp HG et al 2008; Frank RG, Salkever DS.  Generic entry and the pricing of 
pharmaceuticals.  Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 1997;6:75-90; Meltzer 
DM, Basu A, Conti R. The economics of comparative effectiveness studies: societal and 
private perspectives and their implications for prioritizing public investments in 
comparative effectiveness research. Pharmacoeconomics. 2010;28(10):843-53.  
26 See Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy Guide to Pharmaceutical Payment Methods. 
Task force on drug payment methodologies. October 2007.    
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2000 and December 2010 listed on the Medwatch website.27  PHAs targeting all members of 
a therapeutic class were excluded; promotion within class is likely to be complicated by 
strategy beyond the scope of current efforts and available data.  PHAs targeting drugs only 
available in generic formulation were excluded since these products are rarely promoted28; 
PHAs targeting over-the-counter medications, devices and specialty drugs were excluded 
since they are typically not promoted using traditional methods.  The final sample consists 
of nine drugs (Table 1).   
 
The FDA Orange Book was used to abstract the name of the originating firm, approval dates, 
patent expiry dates, FDA approvals for secondary indications, drug reformulations and the 
presence of generic formulations for all sample drugs.29  A review of DDMAC regulatory 
enforcements did not find overlap between sample drugs and other regulatory actions 
involving them in the twelve months preceding and following each advisory. 
 
To measure the value effect of PHAs on pharmaceutical firms, data were obtained on 
average daily stock price valuations and trading volumes for the firms marketing the 
sample drugs as listed on either the New York Stock Exchange™ (NYSE) or the NASDAQ™ 
from the CRSP Daily Stock Market Composite Index™. 30   
 
Data regarding monthly physician-directed promotion for each sample drug was obtained 
from IMS Health’s Integrated Promotional Services™ (IPS) database, 2003– 2010.  This data 
window included a 12-month period prior to and following each PHA, providing enough 
observations to generate statistically meaningful estimates while reducing the risk of 
incorporating longer-term secular trends and market dynamics that might confound the 
                                                 
27 See The US Food and Drug Administration.  Public Health Advisories (Drugs).   Available 
at http://www.FDA.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PublicHealthAdvisories/default.htm.  
28 We did not exclude from the sample drugs for which authorized patent-protected 
generics were available at the time of the advisory, and drugs for which the parent 
compound was available in generic form, but where drug line extensions (e.g. extended 
release versions of the parent compound) remained patent-protected at the time of the 
advisory.   
29 Electronic orange book – approved drug products with therapeutic equivalence 
evaluations. Available at:  http://www.FDA.gov/cder/ob/default.htm  (Accessed 
11.1.2009). 
30 Firms’ year-end reports to shareholders available online were also reviewed to ascertain 
whether there were any merger, acquisition, or in-licensing arrangements during the study 
period which would directly alter the incentives for brand level promotion at the firm level.  
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associations of interest.  Four promotion domains were examined: total promotion 
spending,31 number of visits of pharmaceutical sales representatives to physicians in office-
based practices (“detailing”), number of free samples provided to physicians, and counts of 
journal advertisements.  These activities accounted for approximately 98% of physician-
directed promotion. Measure derivation and definition have been described previously.32 
   
Firms’ quarterly and year-end reports to shareholders (10Q and 10K) available online were 
reviewed to ascertain data on firm revenue overall and by drug preceding the PHA release.  
We were able to obtain 10K reports for eight out of the nine manufacturing firms in the 
sample.  Worldwide drug-specific revenue was available in all 10K reports but quarterly 
revenue was available for three sample drugs.  Consequently, we were unable to match the 
timing of the release of each PHA to drug specific revenues in the preceding quarter for the 
full sample.  Therefore, the main measures of total promotion expenditures and promotion 
by channel is in levels, unadjusted for sales.33 Total promotion spending was transformed 
into 2009 $US using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-all urban items calculator.  
 
Therapeutic substitutes were matched to sample drugs via the American Therapeutics 
Committee (ATC) standard designations (Table 1, last column). When the drug was the only 
member of a class, two practicing physicians were conferred with to identify clinically valid 
alternative class designations.  There were eighty-six drugs matching sample drugs using 
this classification.  Thirty-eight therapeutic substitute drugs were available in patent-
protected form during this period.  Promotion of these therapeutic substitutes was also 
measured using IPS data. 
 
To empirically test H5, drugs with “market power” were defined as those that were first-in-
class, and/or were responsible for revenue comprising more than 10 percent of the parent 
firm’s total revenue for the year preceding the PHA, and/or had usage comprising more 
                                                 
31 Total expenditures include spending on detailing visits, journal advertisements and the 
retail value of free samples. 
32 See Zell ER, McCaig LF, Kupronis BA, Besser RE, Schuchat A. A comparison of the National 
Disease and Therapeutic Index™  and the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey™ to 
evaluate antibiotic usage. Available at: http://amstat.org/sections/srms /Proceedings 
(Accessed July 11, 2008). 
33 Similar to Gonul F, Carter F, Petrova E, Srinivasan K 2001,  Rizzo JA 1999, Narayanan S, 
Manchanda P, Chintagunta P 2005 and Lakdawalla D, Philipson T, Wang YT 2006.  
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than 20 percent of class usage in the month preceding the PHA.34 The first two measures 
were based on ATC classification and 10K reports.  To characterize drug usage prior to each 
PHA, the National Disease and Therapeutic Index™ (NDTI) was used to derive estimates of 
market usage share (measured in prescription units in the month preceding the PHA) for 
each drug relative to usage of all therapeutic class substitutes (Table 1, second to last 
column). The NDTI has been used in previous efforts to examine office-based prescribing 
behavior and is similar in coverage and scope to the National Ambulatory Care Medical 
Survey, a nationally representative survey of office-based physicians conducted by the 
National Center for Health Statistics.35  
 
Gabitril, Adderall and Chantix accounted for more than 20 percent of all usage in their 
respective therapeutic class at the time of the PHA release; Strattera and Chantix were first 
entrants into their therapeutic class; and Duragesic, Crestor and Adderall were responsible 
for 10 percent or more of parent firm revenue in the year preceding the PHA.  Hence we 
consider them “market dominant” drugs; the remaining three agents (Paxil, Elidel, Ketek) 
are considered non-dominant market drugs.  The branded therapeutic substitutes of market 
dominant drugs numbered twenty-seven. 
 
Analytical Methods 
The Medwatch reported date of PHA release is the main timing instrument.  
 
Standard event study methods were employed to test H1 in the full sample: an OLS 
regression correlating the advisory release to three- and five-day changes in the direction 
                                                 
34 We also estimate changes in the counts of specific promotions in this subsample (results 
not reported). 
35 The NDTI collects data two days per quarter from a sample of 4,800 office-based 
physicians in the US and applies sample weights to derive nationally representative 
estimates. See Alexander GC, Sehgal NL, Moloney RM, Stafford RS. National trends in 
treatment for Type 2 diabetes mellitus, 1994-2007. Archives of Internal Medicine. 
2008;168:2088-2094;  
Dorsey ER, Rabbani A, Gallagher SA, Conti R, Alexander GC.  The impact of black box 
warnings on the use of atypical antipsychotic medicines.  Archives of Internal Medicine 
2010;170:96-103; Stafford RS, Radley DC.  The underutilization of cardiac medications of 
proven benefit, 1990 to 2002.  Journal of the American College of Cardiology, 2003;41:56-
61; Zell ER, McCaig LF, Kupronis BA, Besser RE, Schuchat A. A comparison of the National 
Disease and Therapeutic Index™ and the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey™ to 
evaluate antibiotic usage. Available at: http://amstat.org/sections/srms /Proceedings 
(Accessed July 11, 2008).  
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and magnitude of average firm stock market valuation and trading volume in the 
NYSE/NASDAQ Composite Index.36  These changes were compared to estimated changes in 
the price and volume of the NYSE/NASDAQ Composite Index over the corresponding 
period, and to those experienced by the same firms for which a drug was the subject of a 
district court Paragraph IV decision 2003-2009, but not the subject of a PHA. Identification 
and timing of this comparison sample was taken from Panettoni (2011) (Appendix). 
Theoretically, Paragraph IV ruling adverse to a firms’ patent-protected drug should result in 
smaller stock market valuation decreases than PHAs, in part because Paragraph IV filings 
affect only six months of a drug’s marketing exclusivity, whereas PHAs affect the drug’s 
entire remaining patent term (Chart).   
 
To test H2’ and H3’, monthly promotion expenditures and counts of detailing visits, journal 
advertisements and free samples over all drugs were examined.  Spending estimates and 
counts preceding and following each PHA were tested for statistically significant differences 
using the Student’s t-test.  The Durbin-Watson test was used to examine the data for 
potential first order serial correlation.  To account for observed serial correlation37, 
generalized estimating equations (GEE) were used to estimate the direction, magnitude and 
significance of promotion following the PHA compared to promotion preceding the PHA.38 A 
log-link function that assumed error distributions based on the nature of the outcome 
variables (e.g. negative binomial for count data and gamma distribution for possibly skewed 
expenditure measures) was used, and all coefficients were transformed into interpretable 
units by exponentiation. Drug-level random effects were included in all models and 
interacted with monthly dummy variables to account for potential independent alterations 
in the competitive landscape.   
 
To test H5, we re-estimated the models restricted to the market dominant sample drugs and 
their therapeutic substitutes.  
 
Analyses were performed using Stata version 10.1 (College Station, TX). Estimated changes 
were considered statistically significant at the t or z statistic equal to 2.00 or greater in 
                                                 
36 See Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay 1997. 
37 See Huskamp et al 2008. 
38 See Hardin JW, Hilbe JM. Generalized estimating equations. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & 
Hall, 2003.  
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absolute value.   
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
The main weakness of the analytic method is an assumption that each PHA is a public and 
exogeneous “shock” to the market.  However, the exact time of day when each PHA was 
released is unknown.  Some PHAs could have been made after the market closed on the 
release day.  In these cases, a change in the stock market performance would be delayed.  
Additionally, leakage of the PHA could have occurred prior to the day of the announcement 
leading to anticipatory valuation changes.  Other announcements regarding firm activities 
independent, but coincident with the PHA could have independently affected firm 
valuations.  
 
Consequently, the timing and content of media reports mentioning the drug, the PHA 
and/or the firm were examined.  Academic LexisNexis was searched using these terms in 
major world publications for the period beginning one-month prior to and ending one-
month following each PHA release.39  For PHAs announced in the press previous to the 
official FDA release date, the models were re-estimated with this release date.  For the firms 
with coincident announcements affecting firm value, the models were re-estimated at the 
drug level.    
 
We also examined whether there was evidence supporting the hypothesis that PHAs 
containing more severe wording regarding potential side effects of the drug had more 
appreciable effects on firm stock market valuation and/or promotion than less severe PHAs.  
Sample PHAs were segregated into those that did and did not contain a reference to 
“severe” side effects or “death” (bolded in Table 1, 4th column).  The models were re-
estimated on this stratified sample.   
 
Finally, PHA releases are the product of ongoing FDA-firm level communications and 
negotiations.  Consequently, the release of each PHA may be an “exogenous” shock to the 
market but may not be to the drug’s firm.40 Anticipating the FDA’s announcement, it is 
                                                 
39 See http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/. 
40 Sources within the FDA indicate that the date of the advisory release may be 
unanticipated by the firm, but the presence of the safety review by the OSE staff and safety 
review board will be known by the firm.    
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possible firms may undertake strategies biasing the estimated results. For example, the 
results of the valuation models could be biased downward if the presence of FDA 
investigation of safety concerns for a specific drug and ongoing discussions between firms 
and the FDA regarding labeling changes are pre-emptively reported to stock-holders; the 
promotion results could be biased in either direction if firm marketing departments alter 
promotion intensities in anticipation of the negative effect of the PHA on sales.  We examine 
raw trends 12 months preceding each PHA by drug to detect possible anticipatory pre-
emptive behavior by firms in each outcome measure  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports (top panel) logged OLS estimates of changes in average daily stock market 
valuations and trading volumes for firms 3- and 5-days following PHAs.  Firms whose drugs 
are the targets of a PHA appear to have average stock price declines of 3% with 3- days and 
11% within 5- days following the release. These firms also appear to have non-statistically 
significant average trading volume increases of 17% within 3- days and 16% within 5- days 
following the release. There are no coincident changes in prices and/or trading volume in 
the NYSE/NASDAQ Composite Index (middle panel).  Matched firms manufacturing a drug 
that was the subject of a Paragraph IV district court decision experienced a non-statistically 
significant average 1% decline in stock valuation 3- days after the court found in favor of 
the generic manufacturer and a statistically significant average 2% increases in stock 
valuation 3- days after the court found in favor of the branded firm (bottom panel).  
Estimated 5- day stock price changes are similar in magnitude to those estimated for 3- 
days.  For branded firms experiencing favorable Paragraph IV District Court decisions, 
volume increases were 23% after 3- days (trending toward significance) and 34% after 5- 
days (significant); branded firms experiencing decisions favoring generic firms did not 
experience appreciable volume changes. 
 
Table 3 reports (top panel) pooled GEE estimates of changes in promotion 3- months, 6- 
months and 12- months after PHA releases among targeted drugs.  3- months after a PHA 
we find statistically significant 83% decreases in journal ads and 29% declines in detailing 
visits to physicians.  Estimated reductions in total promotion spending and the number of 
free samples are not statistically significant.  6- months after PHAs’ release we estimate 
statistically significant 46% decreases in total promotion spending, 45% declines in  
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detailing visits to physicians and 84% declines in journal ads.  The number of free samples 
also declined, but the reduction was not statistically significant. 12- months after PHAs’ 
release non-statistically significant decreases in promotion expenditures and promotion by 
channel are observed. Table 3 (bottom panel) reports GEE estimates of changes in 
promotion 3- months, 6- months and 12- months after PHAs release among the 38 branded 
therapeutic substitutes of the PHA targeted drug.  We did not find statistically significant 
changes in promotional expenditures overall or by channel in this sample coincident with 
targeted PHAs.  
 
Table 4 reports (top panel) pooled stock market valuation models restricted to the seven 
market-dominant drugs in the sample targeted by a PHA. Results are similar in magnitude 
and direction to those reported in the results for the pooled sample (Table 2), albeit smaller 
in absolute magnitude.  Hence whether dominant or not, firms targeted by a PHA 
experience a reduction in stock market valuation at least temporarily. Table 4 (middle 
panel) reports pooled promotion models for the 27 therapeutic substitutes of the seven 
market dominant drugs. Results suggest that the manufacturers of therapeutic substitutes 
of market dominant agents significantly increase their promotion expenditures 3- months 
(49%) and 6- months (29%) following the PHA. This suggests manufacturers of therapeutic 
substitutes of market dominant drugs recognize the PHA release as an opportunity to 
promote their product more aggressively. Table 4 (bottom panel) reports estimated pooled 
changes in promotion for the dominant drugs targeted by PHAs. Results suggest that PHA 
targeted firms marketing drugs with dominant market shares do not change total 
promotion expenditures 3- months and 6- months following the PHA.  Only the estimated 
decrease in total promotion expenditures at 6- months is statistically significant at 
traditional levels.   Further investigation (results available upon request) suggests there is 
heterogeneity in this sample at the drug level in 3- and 6- month changes in promotion after 
PHAs. 3- months after the PHA release, we observe statistically significant decreases in total 
promotion spending among Adderall and Strattera, non-statistically significant decreases in 
promotion expenditures among Chantix, Gabitril and Duragesic, and statistically significant 
increases in spending for Crestor.  6- months after the PHA release, we observe statistically 
significant decreases in total promotion spending among Adderall, Chantix, Strattera, 
Gabitril and Duragesic, and statistically significant increases in spending for Crestor.  3- and 
6- months following PHAs, we estimate statistically significant declines in detailing visits,  
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journal ads, and free samples among Adderall, Chantix, Strattera, Gabitril and Duragesic 
while Crestor increased detailing and free samples. 
 
Sensitivity analyses reveal several PHAs were mentioned in the press in the days preceding 
the release date (Paxil, Duragesic and Gabitril) (available upon request).  However, use of 
these alternative dates for these drugs did not yield material differences in the estimated 
magnitude, direction or significance of the changes in the pooled firm valuation and 
promotion results.  The press reported coincident but unrelated events that could affect 
firm valuations for three firms.  These firms exhibit some limited differences in valuation 
changes relative to the pooled sample: Astrazeneca experienced an increase in stock price 
coincident with the timing of the advisory, the others (GSK and Sanofi Aventis) experienced 
decreases in stock price and increases in trading volumes similar in magnitude to the 
pooled results. An examination of the raw trends suggest no significant additional breaks in 
stock price, trading value or promotion preceding each PHA; the majority of drugs in the 
sample exhibit stable trends preceding the PHA release.  One drug  (Crestor) exhibits 
significant decreases in promotion previous to the PHA release and significant increases 
after the PHA; this pattern of behavior may be due to the release of studies in the medical 
literature preceding the PHA implicating Crestor and other class drugs with negative side 
effects.  Other sensitivity analyses are consistent with those found in the full sample.  
 
DISCUSSION   
Following a PHA, targeted firms are observed to exhibit average 3-day stock price declines 
of 3% and trading volume increases of 17% and average 5-day stock price declines of 11% 
and trading volumes increases of 16%.  On average, there are no corresponding declines in 
average prices or increases in trading volume for the NYSE/NASDAQ Composite Index.  The 
magnitude  of  the  effect  of  PHAs  on  stock  valuation  appears  to  be  greater  than  the 
magnitude of the effect of Paragraph IV court decisions favoring generic firms while the 
direction of the two effects are the same. Three months following PHAs there are significant 
average decreases in journal ads (83%) and detailing visits (29%) to physicians,  ceteris 
paribus.    Six  months  following  PHAs  there  are  significant  average  declines  in  total 
promotion spending (46%), journal ads (84.4%) and detailing visits (45%) to physicians; 
the number of free samples remains unchanged.  Twelve months following PHAs there are 
no statistically significant changes in promotion.  Among therapeutic substitutes, pooled  
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estimation reveals no statistically significant changes in promotion three, six and twelve 
months following PHAs. The valuation results apply to both to market dominant and non-
dominant  drugs  targeted  by  a  PHA,  although  impacts  are  smaller  in  magnitude  for  the 
dominant  drugs.  Furthermore,  manufacturers  of  therapeutic  substitutes  of  market 
dominant drugs appear to significantly increase promotion expenditures following PHAs, 
suggesting potential market stealing behavior. Results are robust to additional sensitivity 
checks.  
 
To our knowledge this research is the first to examine how FDA PHAs affect market 
valuations of biopharmaceutical firms.  The results are consistent in spirit and in direction 
with Panattoni (2011) who examines the effect of another type of negative information, 
Paragraph IV decisions, on branded firm performance.  PHAs effects on firm valuations are 
greater in magnitude than those estimated for a matched sample of firms following 
Paragraph IV decisions favoring generic manufacturers. Differences in the estimated 
magnitudes of these two types of negative public announcements on firms are plausible 
given the public visibility of changes in safety profiles of FDA approved drugs and their 
potential impact on the remaining life-cycle of the drug; Paragraph IV decisions in Federal 
District Courts would be expected to be important to a smaller section of the marketplace, 
although critical to the firm’s ability to extract super-competitive profits by the time of 
patent expiration.   
 
To our knowledge this research is the first to examine firms response to the release of 
PHAs.  Pooled estimates showing significant declines in promotion expenditures six months 
after PHAs are consistent in direction with work by Majumdar, Almasi, and Stafford (2004) 
describing substantial reductions in physician- and patient-targeted promotion 
expenditures on hormone replacement therapy following initial findings of the highly 
publicized Women’s Health Initiative (WHI) report.41 Our primary insight into potential firm 
promotion response to the release of PHAs is that the direction and timing of changes are 
fundamentally dependent on the function(s) of promotion in the branded 
biopharmaceutical marketplace (Chart), holding regulatory rules and enforcement constant 
(Chart).  The results documenting a decrease in promotion spending and promotion by 
                                                 
41 See Majumdar SR, Almasi EA, Stafford RS.  Promotion and prescribing of hormone 
replacement therapy after report of harm by the Women’s Health Initiative.  Journal of the 
American Medicine Association. 2004;292:1983-1988.  
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channel are generally consistent with previous work suggesting promotion of patent-
protected drugs after initial launch surge serves a predominantly persuasive role.  Were the 
promotion predominantly informative, we would not expect reductions in promotion 
efforts and could see increases (Chart).  Furthermore, free sample volumes do not change 
significantly after PHAs in all models; this result is consistent with previous work by Joseph 
and Mantrala (2009) suggesting promotion by this channel may serve a predominantly 
informational role for the patient.42  Findings segregated by market share position suggest 
that the degree to which promotion serves a predominantly informational versus 
persuasive role may differ by the availability of therapeutic substitutes and consequently 
the cross price elasticity of demand between potential therapeutic competitors (a finding 
consistent with the behavioral model).43  
 
The FDA may consider a number of complex factors in deciding when to issue a safety alert.  
The valuation results suggest a potentially important consequence of FDA regulatory 
warnings: short-term changes in the perceived value of the firm by the marketpla ce. Our 
results suggest the agency could include the impact of the PHA on firm valuation as part of 
its  risk-based  approach.  Additionally,  our  findings  imply  the  FDA  should  generally 
anticipate declines in branded promotion when a PHA is released on a pate nt-protected 
drug. These declines may have indeterminate effects on consumer welfare if a portion of 
such promotion serves an informational role for consumers.  Whether the informational or 
persuasive role of promotion dominates for which patent protected drugs and when over a 
product’s lifecycle is critical to interpreting consumer welfare implications of PHAs.44 
 
Our  results  are  also  relevant  to  interpreting  numerous  previous  studies  examining  the 
impact of PHAs on the use of other therapies.45  Significant declines in promotion following 
                                                 
42 See Kissan J, Mantrala M. A Model of the Role of Free Drug Samples in Physicians’ 
Prescription Decisions. Marketing Letters. 2009; 20:15-29.  
43 Changes in the level and intensity of product marketing between channels after a 
Medwatch safety advisory may also differ by drug.  See Jean-Jacques Lambin 1970 and 
Narayanan S, Desiraju R, Chintagunta PK 2004, this is an interesting avenue for future 
research.    
44 This suggestion is consistent with Azoulay’s 2002 work on the direct and indirect effects 
of increasing scientific knowledge on the usage of patent-protected pharmaceuticals. 
45 See for example, Alexander GC, Sehgal NL, Moloney RM, Stafford RS 2008; Dorsey ER, 
Rabbani A, Gallagher SA, Conti R, Alexander GC 2010; Stafford RS, Radley DC 2003; Morgan 
OW, Griffiths C, Majeed A. Interrupted time-series analysis of regulations to reduce  
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a  PHAs  may  directly  and  independently  affect  demand  for  a  drug,  ceteris  paribus.  The 
combined  (and  likely  correlated)  effect  exerted  on  demand  by  the  PHA  and  significant 
decreases in promotion may be larger than the sum of independent effects. Consequently, if 
an analyst does not take decreases in promotion into account, this omission could lead to 
overestimating (and misattributing) the direct effect of the PHA on drug use. Our findings 
suggest previous documented decreases in drug utilization in the US likely overstate the 
direct  effect  of  PHAs  on  physician  prescribing.46  The  net  effect  of  these  changes  on 
consumer welfare depends in part on the market power of the PHA targeted drug. 47 The 
practical direction, magnitude and independent correlates of the bias should be the subject 
of future empirical research to inform future FDA policy-making.  
 
The study has important limitations not discussed above.   First, the study was not designed 
to examine other actions by firms to promote consumer welfare, which may have changed 
in important ways as a result of PHAs.  For example, in response to a safety concern, firms 
could shift promotion resources to patient advocacy or other efforts to build corporate 
goodwill or shift away from public service activities that are complements to drug 
promotion.  Whether and how PHAs alter corporate engagement with social messaging is an 
important direction for future work.  Second, data availability limitations prevented an 
analysis of changes in promotion after PHAs targeted to specific physician specialties 
and/or consumers. Given the sophistication of pharmaceutical firm marketing research 
departments, we expect aggregate changes in promotion spending overall and by channel to 
                                                                                                                                                 
paracetamol (acetaminophen) poisoning. PLoS Med. 2007 Apr;4(4):e105; Katz LY, Kozyrskyj 
AL, Prior HJ, et al. Effect of regulatory warnings on antidepressant prescription rates, use of 
health services and outcomes among children, adolescents and young adults. CMAJ. 
2008;178:1005-1011; Smalley W, Shatlin D, Wysowski DK, et al.  Contraindicated use of 
Cisapride: impact of Food and Drug Administration Regulatory Action. Journal of the 
American Medicine Association. 2000;284:3036-3039; Jacoby JL, Fulton J, Cesta M, Heller M.  
After the black box warning: dramatic changes in ED use of droperidol.  American Journal of 
Emergency Medicine.  2005;23:196. 
46 It is also possible that usage of these drugs following the advisory release may be affected 
by the choices of other actors, such as formulary placement by insurance coverage and 
reimbursement committees.  Documenting the potential use of FDA Medwatch advisories 
for the coverage and formulary placement decisions of insurers is an important avenue for 
future work aiming to elucidate the components of the net effect of FDA advisories on 
treatment usage. 
47 It is important to mention that among numerous recent examples the release of a PHA 
targeting one drug in a therapeutic class is subsequently followed by a class-wide PHA 
suggesting therapeutic substitutes may typically share potential side effect and safety 
profiles.  
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mask important differences by physician specialty and consumer group. Finally, we 
examined a selected sample of PHAs targeting on-patent drugs chosen for analytical 
convenience. While this sample comprises a highly publicized and clinically important set of 
PHAs, further work is needed to describe and interpret the impact of FDA class-wide PHAs 
on firm valuations and potential promotion responses.   
 
In summary, pharmaceutical firms’ market valuations are negatively affected by FDA 
Medwatch advisory releases targeting patent-protected drugs.  In response to FDA-required 
labeling changes, firms appear to decrease drug-specific promotion to physicians. The 
timing of the results suggest that while FDA advisories are likely to have an immediate 
impact on valuations of firms whose drugs are adversely affected, effects on promotion 
levels will likely occur more gradually due to the timing of regulatory review, within-firm 
budgeting and between-firm promotion contracts. There appears to be heterogeneity in 
market valuation response and promotion at the drug level, based in part on the market 
position of the drug with respect to potential therapeutic substitutes. While these results 
may be subject to some limitations, they remain important for interpreting and 
understanding more comprehensively provider and patient responses to recent historical 
FDA actions, and for informing future efforts by the FDA and drug manufacturers seeking to 
optimize the impact of regulatory actions on the safe and effective use of prescription 


















decrease in benefit/risk 
ratio
none or  none or  none or 
 favors branded firm - 
increase in length of 
patent life
favors generic firm - 





yes yes yes yes yes
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Therapeutic Substitute Drug 
Class
Paxil™ GSK 12/7/2005
Pregnancy may increase the risk for congenital 
malformations, particularly cardiac malformations
Dec. 29, 1992 14% SSRIs/SNRIs
Strattera™* Lilly 9/28/2005 Risk of suicidal thinking in children and adolescents  Nov. 26, 2002 18% psychostimulants
Duragesic™* Janssen 7/14/2005 Deaths and overdoses Aug. 7, 1990 2%
opoid based pain medications/ 
narcotic analgesics
Crestor™* Astrazeneca 3/1/2005
Advanced age (> 65 years), have hypothyroidism, 
and/or renal insufficiency should be considered to 
have a greater risk for developing myopathy 
Aug. 12, 2003 9% statins
Elidel™ Novartis 3/9/2005 Linked to cancer Dec. 13, 2001  18% topical steroids
Gabitril™* Cephalon 2/17/2005 Risk of seizures in patients without epilepsy  Sep. 30, 1997 36% benzodiazepines
Adderall™* Shire 2/8/2005
Canadian drug regulatory agency has suspended the 
sale of Adderall XR in the Canadian market
Oct. 11, 2001 49% psychostimulants
Ketek™ Aventis 1/19/2006 Increased frequency of liver-related adverse events  31-Mar-00 11% macrolide based antibiotics 
Chantix™* Pfizer 1/31/2008 Severe changes in mood and behavior 9-May-02 55%
Zyban™/Wellbutrin™ 
(bupropion) listed as 
"antismoking uses"
Date of product launch is taken from the FDA Orange book.
Therapeutic class substitutes are derived from the ATC system.
TABLE 1: Branded (Patent Protected) Biophamaceutical Drugs Affected by FDA Advisories 2005-2009
* indicates first in class or high market share molecules (usage >20% of ATC class in month previous to advisory) 
Market share is calculated as the usage of the molecule in the month previous to the advisory release as a percentage of total usage of therapeutic class substitutes based on ATC system.  Data 
from IMS Health's National Disease and Therapeutic Index™ was used to calculate market share.
Date of advisory and summary of the advisory content is taken from the FDA website.
213 days 5 days 3 days 5 days
percent effect -3.120 -11.000 17.100 16.200
percent variation 0.400 0.600 17.200 36.200
z -7.800 -18.333 0.994 0.448
percent effect 4.350 6.710 11.300 14.000
percent variation 3.560 4.100 23.400 18.300
z 1.222 1.637 0.483 0.765
percent effect 2.100 2.600 23.400 34.100
percent variation 1.000 1.000 12.200 11.300
z 2.100 2.600 1.918 3.018
percent effect -1.200 -1.100 6.780 5.300
percent variation 0.210 0.360 6.000 7.800
z -5.714 -3.056 1.130 0.679
Bold indicates statistically significant at the 2.0 or greater absolute value level.
Log dependent variable models are estimated adjusting for seasonality and first order autocorrelation (AR1).
Reported percent effects and percent variation are transformed coefficients 100(exp(coefficient)-1)).  
Data are derived from the composite NASDAQ™ and New York Stock Exchange™ listed in the CRSP Daily Stock Market Index™.
decision favors generic drug
Comparison group 1: NASDAQ composite index 
In sample firms targeted by FDA advisories
TABLE 2. OLS Estimated Changes in Stock Valuation and Trading Volumes Among Firms Affected by FDA 
Advisories
Comparison group 2: Firms with Paragraph IV District Court Decisions matched to in-sample firms targeted by  FDA 
advisories 
decision favors branded drug
price volume
223 months 6 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 12 months
percent effect -26.655 -46.206 -34.949 -82.967 -84.118 -87.381 -17.304 -41.725 -27.385 -28.823 -45.119 -41.725
percent variation 18.530 22.140 33.643 41.907 22.140 171.828 27.762 48.736 48.290 13.883 22.262 22.140
z -1.438 -2.087 -1.039 -1.980 -3.799 -0.509 -0.623 -0.856 -0.567 -2.076 -2.027 -1.885
percent effect 0.200 -12.190 -24.422 -1.980 2.020 -4.877 1.005 -14.786 -30.927 -7.688 -13.929 -26.655
percent variation 17.586 18.530 20.925 6.396 11.182 4.081 26.871 56.831 17.468 10.738 12.750 40.495
z 0.011 -0.658 -1.167 -0.310 0.181 -1.195 0.037 -0.260 -1.770 -0.716 -1.093 -0.658
Promotion data are taken from Integrated Promotional Services™.  
Bold indicates statistically significant at the 2.0 or greater absolute value level.
Log dependent variable models are estimated adjusting for seasonality and first order autocorrelation (AR1).    
Reported percent effects and percent variation are transformed coefficients 100(exp(coefficient)-1)).  
TABLE 3. GEE Estimated Changes in Promotion After FDA Advisory Release Among Affected Branded Drugs and 38 Branded Therapeutic Substitute Drugs  
total promotion expenditures
Affected Sample Branded Drugs
38 Branded Therapeutic Substitute Drugs, Unaffected by Advisory
count of journal ads number of samples number of detailing visits
Ϯϯ3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days
percent effect -2.400 -3.100 14.400 18.200
percent variation 1.100 1.400 4.700 14.200
z -2.182 -2.214 3.064 1.282
3 months 6 months 12 months
percent effect 49.332 29.175 13.655
percent variation 24.234 12.975 12.075
z 2.036 2.249 1.131
3 months 6 months 12 months
percent effect -4.877 0.290 0.450
percent variation 5.338 63.232 49.182
z -0.914 0.005 0.009
GEE Estimated Changes in Promotional Expenditures Among 6 Market Dominant Drugs  
Bold indicates statistically significant at the 2.0 or greater absolute value level.
Reported percent effects and percent variation are transformed coefficients 100(exp(coefficient)-1)). 
total promotion expenditures
Data are derived from the composite NASDAQ™ and New York Stock Exchange™ listed in the 
CRSP Daily Stock Market Index™.
Promotion data are taken from IMS Health's Integrated Promotional Services™.  
Table 4. Estimated Changes in Stock Valuations and Trading Volumes After FDA Advisory Releases 
Among Firms and Estimated Changes in Promotional Expenditures for the 6 Market Dominant Drugs
price volume
total promotion expenditures
OLS Estimated Changes in Stock Valuation and Trading Volumes Among Affected Firms
GEE Estimated Changes in Promotional Expenditures Among 38 Therapeutic Substitutes of 6 Market Dominant 
Drugs
24brand company decision announcement winner
Augmentin™ GSK 7/19/2002 5/23/2002 generic
Relafen™ GSK 8/14/2001 8/14/2001 generic
Zofran™ GSK 8/20/2004 8/24/2004 brand
Prozac™ Lilly 1/12/1999 1/13/1999 brand
Zyprexa™ Lilly 4/14/2005 4/14/2005 brand
Sporonox™ Janssen 7/28/2004 7/29/2004 generic
Prilosec™ Astrazeneca 10/11/2002 10/11/2002 brand
Toprol xl™ Astrazeneca 1/17/2006 1/18/2006 generic
Accupril™ Pfizer 6/28/2004 6/30/2004 brand
Celebrex™ Pfizer 3/20/2007 3/20/2007 brand
Lipitor™ Pfizer 12/16/2005 12/16/2005 brand
APPENDIX. Paragraph IV District Court Decisions Included In Analysis For Comparative 
Purposes
Sample universe and district court decisions taken from Panattoni LE, The effect of Paragraph IV decisions and 
generic entry before patent expiration on brand pharmaceutical firms, Journal of Health Economics, Volume 30, 
Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 126-145.
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